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Abstract
The paper reports results of a survey among active forecasters of the German business cycle.
Relying on 82 respondents from 37 different institutions, we investigate what models and theo-
ries forecasters subscribe to and find that they are pronounced conservative in the sense, that
they overwhelmingly rely on methods and theories that have been well-established for a long
time, while more recent approaches are relatively unimportant for the practice of business cycle
forecasting. DSGE models are mostly used in public institutions. In line with findings in the
literature there are tendencies of “leaning towards consensus” (especially for public institutions)
and “sticky adjustment of forecasts” with regard to new information. We find little evidence
that the behaviour of forecasters has changed fundamentally since the Great Recession but there
are signs that forecast errors are evaluated more carefully. Also, a stable relationship between
preferred theories and methods and forecast accuracy cannot be established. (150 words)
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Professional forecasters are a special caste of the econ tribe (Leijonhufvud, 1973). Ever since the
invention of professional economic forecasting as a business some members of the caste regularly
attract public attention (Friedman, 2014; FAZ, 2016) and are often regarded as a “synonym” for
the “prototype” economist (Nienhaus, 2009). In reality, however, the work of this group is to a
large extent a “black box” for other (i.e. academic) economists or the general public.
So, why are professional forecasters, possible interactions among them, their work and forecast-
ing models of interest at all?
First, policy-relevant institutions as ECB or the Federal Reserve System in the U.S. but also
private firms like “Consensus Economics” regularly poll forecasters on how economically educated
actors form their expectations of future macroeconomic development. Arguably, professional fore-
casters seem to play a prominent role in shaping society’s expectations on economic issues even if
journalists and politicians regularly blame them as “duds”. Second, rational inattention models
(Sims, 1998, 2003; Woodford, 2002; Maćkowiak and Wiederholt, 2009) as well as models of sticky
information (Mankiw, 2006) received a lot of interest in the last couple of years in macroeconomics.
Carroll (2003) implicitly assumes a sticky information environment and delivers a model based
on “epidemiology” (= informedness as a passive desease infection) to model the trickle-down of
information flows from highly informed experts to the general public, Coibion and Gorodnichenko
(2015) argue that the dynamics of expectation formation and the updating of expectations as
observed in survey data is more in line with “rational inattention”. As different models of ex-
pectation formation compete with each other, it is therefore necessary to investigate the process
of forecasting itself. Third, the turmoil of the recent financial crisis and the deep recession in its
aftermath brought economists, economic models and especially the forecasters in Leijonhufvud’s
econ tribe story under the harsh criticism of not having foreseen such a crisis. The catchy title
of Carmen Reinhart’s and Ken Rogoff’s much disputed book on financial crises – “This time is
different” ironically mirrors that (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). The topic of short memory is old in
economic history. On the title page of the 2005 edition of Charles Kindleberger’s “Manias, Panics
and Crashes”, Paul Samuelson was cited with the quotation “Sometime in the next five years you
may kick yourself for not reading and re-reading Kindleberger’s ’Manias, Panics, and Crashes’.”
(Kindleberger and Aliber, 2005) This, however, did not avoid the largest post-war financial and
economic crisis to occur. Such a misfortune already hit Irving Fisher back in the 1930s hard in
its reputation (Friedman, 2014).1 Therefore, getting a better understanding about the forecasting
industry and how forecasters cope with misfortune in great financial and economic crises is, of high
relevance for the future development of economic models and the general public.
This paper is an attempt to shed light into the dark room of prophecy and the work of the
“fortune tellers” (Friedman, 2014) nowadays and to answer some questions about the motivation
and models behind macroeconomic forecasting in Germany. For this purpose, we conducted an
online-survey among professional forecasters which are all making forecasts for Germany – either in
public or private institutions in Germany or in supranational or international organizations outside
Germany.2
Our approach is linked to several strands of the literature on surveys in economics: First, it
relates to the literature on questionnaires among economists in general, which have been conducted
for long time and for a variety of reasons. The macroeconomic controversies of the seventies and
eighties prompted some efforts (see, e.g., Frey et al., 1984, 1983; Pommerehne et al., 1983, 1984;
Schneider et al., 1983) to clarify to which school of thought the majority of economist tended and
whether some consensus exists among economists. Consequently, a number of papers addresses the
1Ex post, from a longer historical perspective, it is always astonishing how näıvely the rosy economic development
is regularly expected to last for longer. However, a deeper investigation on the theories behind expectation formation
as in Beckert (2016) is beyond the scope of this empirical paper.
2We concentrated our efforts on institutions based in Germany and surveyed only some forecasters in international
organizations producing forecasts for the German economy.
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broader question, whether economists can achieve a consensus over recommendations for economic
policy (Pommerehne et al., 1984; Whaples, 1996; Fuller and Geide-Stevenson, 2003). There are,
however, more aspects which are investigated by surveying economists. Enste et al. (2009) ask,
whether notable difference to the beliefs of economic “layman” exist. In this context the political
and general beliefs of economists and their interaction with policy advice have been of interest
(Schneider et al., 2007; Frey et al., 2010). The process of educating economists is an evergreen topic
in the literature (see, e.g., Colander, 2005, 2003), which has become subject of critical scrutiny in the
aftermath of the financial crisis. Furthermore, internal issues of the profession have led to several
survey-based studies, e.g., the ranking of scholarly journals (Bräuninger and Haucap, 2001), the
magnitude of scientific misconduct (Necker, 2012), or the happiness of academic economists (Feld
et al., 2015).
Second, the paper relates to the literature using surveys among professional forecasters. Batch-
elor and Dua (1990a,b) analyse, how divergent theories and models are across different forecasting
institutions and ask, whether forecasting accuracy depends on these differences. To make a long
story short, the authors of these early studies do not find a strong impact of theoretical positions
and forecasting techniques on the quality of the forecasts. In a similar vein, Ashiya (2006) cannot
find a respective connection based on Japanese data. The European Central Bank (2009, 2014) has
conducted special surveys among participants of the regular “Survey of Professional Forecasters”.
The results confirm a great importance of judgemental forecasting as opposed to model based fore-
casting (Fildes and Stekler, 2002; Lawrence et al., 2006). Furthermore, they find a very low “relative
weight” of use of modern macroeconomic (i.e. DSGE) models, which contrasts to the high academic
importance of these models (Wieland and Wolters, 2013; Del Negro and Schorfheide, 2013). In a
similar vein, Stark (2013) presents results based on a special survey among the U.S. “Survey of
Professional Forecasters”. According to his results, forecasters use a combination of methods with
a high degree of judgemental methods. Again, models, that are arguably a little old-fashioned but
robust – like traditional IS/ LM models – , are still of great relative importance for the forecaster’s
tool box (Krugman, 2000).
The successes and failures of macroeconomic forecasting have also been addressed from a soci-
ological perspective. Evans (2002) has conducted interviews with British forecasters. Based on the
collected information he emphasizes the impact of political developments on the theoretical orien-
tation of forecasters and their related policy advice. Reichmann (2013) has interviewed forecasters
in three Austrian research institutes as well as representative users of the forecasts in economic
and political organizations. He concludes that macroeconomic models are rather unimportant for
the emergence of a consensus among forecasters. Instead, various formal and informal networks
dominate the macroeconomic discussion.
Our paper adds to the literature by investigating the following issues: Which models and
theories forecasters do subscribe to? Do theories differ when it comes to forecasting in contrast to
general beliefs about how the economy works? Has the behaviour of forecasters or the models used
changed since the Great Recession? Is there a relationship between theories/ models and forecast
accuracy? What about “leaning towards consensus” or herding, inefficient information processing
or changes in risk-aversion/ attitudes?
Confirming previous findings, we are not able to establish a link between forecast accuracy on
the one hand and theories and methods on the other hand. Regarding the latter, we find that
practitioners tend to be hesitant in adopting methods that are currently championed by the aca-
demic discussion with some signs that the younger generation seems to be more open to non-linear
and machine-learning-based methods. We find that forecasters are pronounced conservative in the
sense, that they overwhelmingly rely on methods and theories that have been well-established for
a long time, while more recent approaches are relatively unimportant for the practice of business
cycle forecasting. The academic evaluation of publicly funded research institutes (Leibniz associa-
tion institutes) 3 seems to have changed this to some extent as DSGE models are significantly more
3Following the advice of Wissenschaftsrat (1998), the research institutes have undergone a pronounced overhaul
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often used in public institutions.We find almost no evidence that the (self-reported) behaviour of
forecasters has changed substantially since the Great Recession. However, there is evidence for
a “leaning-towards-consensus” attitude (especially among forecasters in public institutions) and
inefficient information processing. Furthermore, the awareness to evaluate forecasts on a regular
base seems to be higher after the crisis.
Section 2 describes the data set. In Section 3 we present the empirical analysis with respect to
the questions raised above. Section 4 discusses the result and summarizes. Further details about
the questionnaire can be found in the appendix sections.
2 Data
2.1 The statistical population
To define the underlying sample of our investigation we have to clarify what we understand as the
kind of ”forecaster” we are interested in. We identified the following criteria to define the group
we are aiming at:
• The institution provides forecasts for the German economy.
• The forecasts are of quantitative nature, i.e. at least a prediction for real GDP growth is
provided. For example, this criterion rules out, associations, which comment on the cur-
rent economic situation, but don’t provide numbers. Also, some commentators on economic
policy with a more heterodox theoretical background, such as the Arbeitsgruppe alternative
Wirtschaftspolitik (Memorandum-Gruppe) (2016) do not match this criterion.
• The forecast is amacroeconomic forecast, i.e. we exclude institutions that provide forecasts for
individual sectors, branches, or regions only from our sample. For example, neither BITKOM
- Germany’s digital association (2016), which provides forecasts for the IT branch only, nor the
Niedersächsisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (NIW) (2016), which provides forecasts
for just only one German state, are part of our sample.
• The institution forecasts on a regular basis. This criterion excludes some individuals, which
have been credited for foreseeing the financial crisis like, e.g. Otte (2011). We do so, since
”false alarms” might be harmful for economic policy as well.
• We refer to business cycle forecasts. In other words, the forecasts have to be made at least
at annual frequency and refer to the economic situation in the coming period.
• We refer to forecasts that are — at least in part — offered as a public good. Some institutions
provide a detailed explanation of the forecasts only for their customers, but are counted in
public rankings with their ”headline” numbers of, say, real GDP growth. Our net-based
search strategy, however, will miss firms that provides their forecasts exclusively for their
customers, although we are not aware of such a firm. Generally, since media coverage is
arguably very important as a marketing tool, we are quite confident that we have not missed
an important part of the forecasting industry.
• In contrast to previous related studies, our basic statistical unit are not the forecasting in-
stitutions, but the individual forecasters. This renders it possible to collect information over
forecasting processes, the motivations of forecasters and the like.
• We refer to currently active forecasters.4
after 1998, which has – inter alia – led to a much stronger orientation towards the academic publication record
(Ketzler and Zimmermann, 2013)
4We have asked retired forecasters and individuals, who are still active as economist, but not as a forecaster for
comments on a pre-test version of the questionnaire.
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Table 1: Response rate to the survey
Number of E-Mails sent 266
Number of E-Mails undeliverable -12
Number of responses ”not appropriate” -17
Number of long-term absences -1
Number of remaining invitations 237
Number of responses 81
Number of responses (complete survey) 56
Response rate (persons) 34%
Response rate (persons, complete) 24%
Response rate (institutions) 67%
Relying on publicly available information we have identified 266 persons that might work on
forecasts for the German economy on a regular basis. We have taken into account institutions that
have been listed in the ranking of Fricke (2016) and the regular reports of Consensus ForecastTM
(2016). Some information we have collected from several web-pages the internet appeared to be
misleading: in some cases the mails have been undeliverable, in same cases automatic response
mails indicated a long term absence of the person and some colleagues informed us that they are
nor in charge of forecasting the German economy. A complete list of all institutions, to which we
have sent at least one invitation email is provided in the appendix. Table 1 gives the quantitative
overview over the responses. The response rates were 34 %, for the contacted persons, and 67 % for
the listed institutions, which are sufficiently high response rates for an online survey. To protect
the anonymity of the respondents, we have to keep the groups rather broad and distinguish four of
them:
• Publicly financed institutes,
• Privately financed institutes,
• Government, central banks, international institutions, and institutions of policy advice,
• Private firms and associations.
2.2 The questionnaire
The final version of the questionnaire consists of nine parts with a total of 24 questions. With this,
we designed a comprehensive and exploratory questionnaire that makes use of different methodolo-
gies for data collection. Consequently, the questions differ quite widely in complexity and estimated
response time. Depending on which seemed most appropriate for a particular question, we included
Likert scales, list boxes and free-text questions.
More specifically, we asked participants about models used for forecasting and theories they
subscribe to hold which may both influence the forecast and the forecasting process, and asked
them quantitative assessment questions aiming at their macroeconomic beliefs. Furthermore, we
addressed questions related to forecasting teams, forecast errors, and potential adjustments that
may have been made after the Great Recession. We were also interested in potential herding be-
haviour and risk management of forecasting teams and also asked about the individual forecaster’s
motivation for choosing economic forecasting as their profession. In the last section, we collected
demographical data. Finally, participants were given the opportunity to comment on the question-
naires and leave their suggestions.
All questions (in English5) can be found in appendix section B. The survey was conducted
as an on-line survey using Limesurvey (LimeSurvey Project Team / Carsten Schmitz, 2017) from
5Potential participants had the choice to answer in German or English.
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January 23rd 2017 to March 6th 2017 (last answer recorded). All possible participants have been
invited to take part by email on January 23rd 2017. Those, that have not answered until then have
been reminded on February 2nd 2017. We also run a pre-test of the survey among a group of retired
forecasters and persons that are still working, but have left the field of macroeconomic forecasting.
3 Empirical results
3.1 Basic demographic statistics
Table 2 gives some information about the survey respondents. While the median age is not aston-
ishing, the median length of work experience gives some food for thought. The cyclical peak before
the Great Recession is usually dated in 2007. This implies that roughly half of the forecasters today
has no on-the-job experience with a (pronounced) recession. This leads to the question, whether
some institutionally embedded experience exists, for example, in the form of experienced colleagues
that might share their memories from the last cyclical downturn (and upswing).
Table 2: Some demographic information
n
Median age of respondent 43 49 [37; 52.5]
Median years experience as a forecaster 50 10 [5; 18]
Share of female forecasters 54 13%
Academic degree or position 56
Diplom: 9








Group of institutions 81
Public institutes: 18
Private institutes: 12
Policy related institutions: 19
Private firms: 31
In brackets: 25 % and 75 % quartiles.
The forecasting industry seems to be “a man’s world”: The share of female forecasters is low
in comparison to the share of women holding a degree in Economics Germany. This is line with
findings of Fondsfrauen (2015), a lobby group promoting women’s careers in the finance industry,
which counts just 4 out of 55 institutions having a female chief economist.
Forecasters usually hold academic degrees, a majority of them received doctoral or Ph.D degrees.
Practically all forecasters named economics as their main field of studies. Only one person has
studied mathematics and two others choose the option “other” fields, but both have a similar field
or an additional field of studies. For the moment, there doesn’t seem to be much competition
for the economists in the field of macroeconomic forecasting. This might be different in related
fields (finance) or, perhaps, will change in the (near) future as machine learning tools become more
accepted as a forecasting tool in this area.
3.2 What theories/ methods do forecasters use?
We start our investigation of methods and theories underlying the regular forecasts with a rather
general question on the factors that influence the forecast. With this question we aim at seeing
how strongly forecasters rely on the use of specific forecasting methodologies or information. For
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Figure 1: Elements of the forecasting process
Which of the following elements do you take into account in your forecasts?
Source: own survey and calculation
example, behavioural economics is a rather new approach, which makes it interesting for us to see
if it has been implemented in forecasting practice yet. Furthermore, we are interested in the speed
of adoption of methods recently discussed in the academic discourse. For example, behavioural
economics is a relatively new approach, which would be interesting for us to see if it has been
implemented in forecasting practice yet. The results are given in Figure 1. According to these an-
swers, most forecasters have little eye for an interdisciplinary approach. Insights from neighbouring
fields like psychology or history are noticed only by a minority of forecasters. By contrast, factors
that may be attributed to a economic viewpoint in a rather narrow sense, are named much more
often. In addition to the pre-defined items, respondents had the opportunity to write-in “other”
elements of their forecasting process. The individual statements are listed in section C. This, in
turn, gave interesting insights. There are some notable exceptions to the general picture: “experi-
ence”, “personal forecasting experience”, “experience based knowledge”, or “historical experience”
were all given as important elements of the forecasting efforts. Furthermore, the mentioned “rule
of thumb(s)” also reflect a specific form of experience as does the reflection on past forecast errors.
Over and above, at least one forecaster emphasized the relevance of institutional knowledge as an
element relevant for forecasting. This is important as it shows that the topic “how personal and
societal experience shapes expectations” is somewhat present among forecasters and a relation to
“historical experience” is established by some individuals.
Figure 2 summarizes the responses to the question about what methods are of importance for the
forecasting process. Obviously, the surveyed forecasters strongly rely on quite traditional methods
like leading indicators, intuitive methods and the iterative national accounts related method.6 By
contrast, some methods recently championed by the academic literature (e.g. machine learning
6For a description of these methods see, e.g., Döhrn (2014).
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Figure 2: Methods used in the forecasting process
How often does your institution use the following methods in the forecasting process?
Source: own survey and calculation
tools, non-linear models and DSGE models) are relatively unpopular. Again, respondents, who
have chosen the option “other methods” have been asked what methods they have in mind, the
answers are listed in appendix section C.
All in all, a marked difference between the recommendations of the academic literature and the
practice of forecasting shines up. There is, however, evidence, that somewhat younger (below the
median age) forecasters as well as forecasters employed at publicly funded research institutes7 tend
to use non-linear and DSGE-based forecasting tools more often. The results reported in Table 3
show that DSGE models are – to a very small extent – more popular among younger forecasters and
are used more frequently in public institutions. The latter also holds for non-linear (e.g, Probit or
Logit type of) models. The two results, however, are not completely independent from each other
since younger forecasters work more often at public institutions, whereas forecasters at private
institutions are — on average — somewhat older.
We also asked for the importance of particular theoretical positions in the forecasting process.
The results of this stimulus are given in Figure 3. First, the claim that no theory is particularly
important for forecasting is remarkably popular among the respondents. In part, this might reflect
a dominance of data-driven approaches in practical forecasting. Turning to the individual theo-
retical approaches, the results point to high importance of Keynesian ones, either under the more
traditional header “Neoclassical Synthesis” or the modern designation “Neo-Keynesianism”. We
also had two write-in answers stating additional theoretical positions that are relevant to at least
one forecaster. The items can be found in appendix section C.
We asked participants about importance of certain theories for the forecasting process, as well
7The respective appendix section provides a list of institutions. We have counted the institutions listed under
“private firms”, “privately financed research institutes” and “associations” as private institutions, all others as public
institutions.
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Table 3: “Modern” methods and selected characteristics of forecasters













Older 2 14 2
[0.62] [0.45]Younger 6 19 0
Probit models
Older 5 10 3
[0.78] [0.72]Younger 6 19 0
Machine learning
Older 0 15 3
[>0.99] [1.00]Younger 1 22 2
Method and nature of institution
DSGE models
Private 5 27 13
[0.03] [0.02]
Public 13 16 7
Probit models
Private 8 22 15
[0.87] [0.77]
Public 9 19 8
Machine learning
Private 0 30 15
[0.39] [0.20]Public 2 23 11
Method and theoretical position
DSGE models
Leaning Keynesian 7 21 19
[0.88] [0.60]
Leaning neo-classical 2 3 9
Probit models
Leaning Keynesian 8 19 19
[>0.99] [0.64]
Leaning neo-classical 3 2 7
Machine learning
Leaning Keynesian 0 25 23 NA
[>0.99]
Leaning neo-classical 0 5 2
Notes: p-values in brackets. Source: own survey and calculation. NA due to insufficient number of obser-
vations.
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Figure 3: Importance of theoretical approaches for the forecasting process
How important are the following theoretical approaches for the forecasting process in your
institution?
Source: own survey and calculation
9








Null hypothesis: Importance is equal
Keynesian theory (Neo-classical synthesis) 3.1 3.4 -1.18 [0.24] 1163 [0.28]
Post-Keynesian economics 2.2 2.4 -0.98 [0.33] 696.5 [0.31]
Monetarism 2.6 2.5 0.12 [0.90] 1093.5 [0.9]
Supply-side economics 3.1 3.1 -0.04 [0.97] 1214.5 [0.98]
Neo-Keynesian economics 3.0 3.2 -0.44 [0.66] 819 [0.70]
New classical economics 2.7 2.7 0.20 [0.84] 974 [0.93]
Real business-cycle theory 2.5 2.2 0.83 [0.41] 1053.5 [0.45]
Austrian economics 2.1 2.2 -0.61 [0.54] 849 [0.40]
Political business-cycle theory 2.2 2.4 -0.71 [0.48] 878 [0.48]
Evolutionary economics 1.3 1.7 -1.81 [0.07] 609 [0.14]
Ordo-liberalism 2.1 2.4 -1.21 [0.23] 716 [0.24]
Notes: The Likert-scale is recoded from 5 (”Extremely important”) to 1 (”Unimportant”).
p-values in brackets. Source: own survey and calculation.
as about the importance of certain theories for the forecaster personally. The results differ only a
little, and are reported in figure 4.
The response to this question is in line with recent claims (see, e.g., Bofinger, 2016), that Ordo-
liberalism and related positions are still of relatively great importance for German economists. It
seems reasonable to assume that normative comments on macroeconomic policy are merely driven
by the personal beliefs of forecasters. Insofar some German forecasters may find themselves in
a somewhat uncomfortable situation, since the theories, which they rely their forecasts on, are
different from the theories founding their normative positions. In table 4 we tested for differences
between “importance for forecasting” and “personal importance” for different groups. Generally,
Keynesian and Neo-Keynesian approaches seem to be important both for forecasting and personally,
but also supply-side economics. Differences between the two points of view are rare. Only in case of
“Evolutionary economics” we find a significant difference at usual levels. “Monetarism” and “Real
business cycle theory” are the only cases where the importance for forecasting is on average higher
than the personal importance.
Last but not least, in table 5 we report results for testing the hypotheses that an individual
preference for a specific school of thought does neither depend on age nor on the nature of the
institution. Interestingly for most of the answer categories there are no significant differences.
Exceptions are the schools of “Monetarism”, “Austrian economics” and “Political business cycles”
for which the null of no differences with regard to age is rejected and “Post-Keynesian economics”
for which the rejection of the no-difference hypothesis is possible with respect to differences in
institutional affiliations. That points to cohort effects with respect to the framing of ideological
positions similar to the cohort effects of shaping beliefs observed in expectation data for the general
public (Malmendier and Nagel, 2016).
3.3 The main reasons for forecasting errors in the eyes of the forecasters
The reasons for forecasting errors have been subject to much academic efforts and public controver-
sies (for an overview of some possible explanation see Fritsche and Tarassow, 2017; Stekler, 2007,
and the literature cited therein). Thus, we have asked forecasters about the reasons for this. The
results, depicted in figure 5 are striking: almost exclusively, forecasters see the most important
sources of forecasting errors outside the forecasting process. Data revisions and wrong assumptions
are frequently named as the things that have gone wrong. The first factor that can be associated
with forecaster’s wrongdoing ranks only at the fourth place among the listed reasons for errors: ,
the possibility of missed structural breaks, Only a minority of the participants points to qualitative
10
Figure 4: Personal importance of theoretical approaches
How important are the following theoretical approaches for you personally?
Source: own survey and calculation
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Table 5: Personal importance of theoretical position by age and institution
Null hypothesis: Does not depend on age
Theoretical position Older Younger t-test Mann
Whitney-test
Keynesian theory (Neo-classical synthesis) 3.2 3.0 -0.42 [0.68] 162.5 [0.87]
Post-Keynesian economics 2.2 2.5 -0.64 [0.53] 126 [0.62]
Monetarism 3.0 2.0 -2.95 [0.01] 66.5 [0.01]
Supply-side economics 3.2 2.7 -1.5 [0.14] 110.5 [0.12]
Neo-Keynesian economics 2.9 3.2 0.61 [0.54] 129.5 [0.54]
New classical economics 2.6 2.5 -0.08 [0.94] 118.5 [0.97]
Real business-cycle theory 1.9 2.2 0.78 [0.44] 138 [0.65]
Austrian economics 2.6 1.8 -2.17 [0.04] 75.5 [0.03]
Political business-cycle theory 2.7 2.0 -1.78 [0.08] 70 [0.09]
Evolutionary economics 1.4 1.2 0.68 [0.50] 107 [0.92]
Ordo-liberalism 2.4 1.9 - 1.04 [0.31] 78.5 [0.19]
Null Hypothesis: Does not depend on nature of institution
Theoretical position Private Public t-test Mann
Whitney-test
Keynesian theory (Neo-classical synthesis) 3.5 3.2 0.91 [0.37] 326 [0.36]
Post-Keynesian economics 2.8 2.0 2.35 [0.02] 253 [0.03]
Monetarism 2.8 2.2 1.49 [0.14] 298.5 [0.16]
Supply-side economics 3.1 3.0 0.32 [0.71] 286.5 [0.62]
Neo-Keynesian economics 3.2 3.2 0.06 [0.95] 213.5 [0.92]
New classical economics 2.9 2.4 1.59 [0.12 ] 273.5 [0.09]
Real business-cycle theory 2.2 2.2 0.06 [0.95] 220.5 [1.00]
Austrian economics 2.4 2.1 0.79 [0.43] 251 [0.42]
Political business-cycle theory 2.6 2.2 1.04 [0.30] 232 [0.37]
Evolutionary economic 1.4 1.3 1.21 [0.24] 217 [0.10]
Ordo-liberalism 2.6 2.3 0.68 [0.49] 212 [0.51]
Notes: The Likert-scale is recoded from 5 (”Extremely important”) to 1 (”Unimportant”).
p-values in brackets. Source: own survey and calculation.
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Figure 5: Sources of forecast errors
Which of the following do you view as sources of forecast errors?
Please chose one or more items and write possible additional reasons.
Source: own survey and calculation
or quantitative problems with the underlying forecasting models. Some hypotheses, albeit quite
popular in the academic literature – the idea of self-destroying forecasts and intentional forecast
errors – find practically no support among the surveyed practitioners. Also, nearly no forecaster
is prepared to admit that forecasting errors occur to do the financier or customer a favour. This
hypothesis is by far the most popular explanation of forecasts errors in the media (Döpke, 2000,
collects some quotes in this direction) and has some support in the political economy of policy
advice (see, e.g. Ngo et al., forthcoming).
The answers given in the open answer category – see appendix section C – however, give some
hints about the narratives which forecasters use to explain their forecast errors: “future is (simply)
unknown” is stated at least twice and “high complexity” is also given as answer. Others point to
(external) economic shocks that occurred but were excluded by assumption from the forecast or
argue that wrong assumptions were made about variables not in the forecasting set (e.g. world
trade volumes, oil prices, exchange rates). One forecaster mentioned “technical” mistakes in the
way corrections were made due to seasonal or working day effects8.
3.4 Quantitative assessments
To obtain insights about the underlying beliefs of forecasters, we have also asked for some rough
quantitative assessments, that may help to gauge the model the forecaster beliefs in. All assessments
refer to a hypothetical macroeconomic situation. The first scenario is devoted to learn about the
forecasters view of fiscal policy. This question has (re-)gained a lot of interest, since Blanchard and
Leigh (2013) have argued in a seminal paper that botched macroeconomic predictions from the
8All statements in the respective open answer category are documented in appendix section C
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IMF may be attributed to an underestimation of the magnitude of the fiscal multiplier. For the
“fiscal thought experiment”, the questionnaire lists several assumptions as documented in appendix
section B.9
Figure 6a shows the magnitude of the multiplier estimated by the respondents in the short-
run and in the long-run. The distribution of the estimates points to the possibility that German
forecasters are at least short-run Keynesians: all multiplier exceed one and the distribution centers
around 1. In the long-run, however, the vast majority of the forecasters that have responded do
not assume that fiscal policy can do any good and assumes a multiplier of by about zero. It is
noteworthy, though, that the survey asked the forecasters to leave the form blank, if they are
not able to give an assessment, which 41 persons actually did (as compared to 40, which gave an
estimate). Furthermore, at least one person took the opportunity of the general comment at the
end of the survey to argue that the information given on the scenario is not sufficient to quantify
the impact of fiscal policy on growth.
The second “thought experiment”, for which respondents are asked to give quantitative guess is
an acceleration of money growth in the Euro area (the ECB increases money supply permanently
1 percentage point faster than previously done) starting from an vaguely defined “equilibrium”
situation in the absence of negative supply shocks.10 Figure 6b shows the distribution of the
estimates in the short- as well as in the long-run. While virtually no forecasters gives money
supply a big role for inflation in the short-run, there is considerable disagreement regarding the
long-run effects: some forecasters see a zero or a minor impact of money growth on inflation.
Roughly half of the respondents, however, assumes even a one-to-one relation between the two
numbers (which might even correspond better to the old-school pre-Friedman quantity theory of
money, as to the version with a non-stable, but predictable money demand).
As a third “thought experiment” – see figure 6c – we asked forecasters about the employment
effects of a 10 % increase of the minimum wage.11 Interestingly, the bulk of answers point to “no”
effects in the short as well as in the long run. However, disagreement is high: Some even assume a
long-run elasticity of 0.75.
To check whether the quantitative assessments are in line with the reported underlying theo-
retical position of the forecasters, we grouped the forecasters into two subgroups: those, who lean
towards more neoclassical positions and those, who have described themselves rather as a Keynesian
and compare the quantitative assessments between these two groups (see Table 6). We confirm sig-
nificant differences regarding the effects of money-supply shifts between the “neo-classical” and the
“Keynesian” camps. We can furthermore see significant differences in the assessment of minimum
wage increases between forecasters working in private and those working in public institutions. It
is interesting to see, that on average forecasters working in public institutions are more concerned
about negative consequences of minimum wage increases than those working in private institutions.
To what extent ideological positions of the respective institutions play a role is a question for further
research. There are no significant differences between the camps regarding the “fiscal multiplier
thought experiment”.
3.5 Consequences of the Great Recession
Figure 7 shows the responses to a question exploring changes in the forecasting process that might
have happened following the recent financial crisis and the subsequent Great Recession. The most
popular answer is that the institutions now uses “new” methods in forecasting. However, we
offered a write-in possibility in this question to add “additional” methods that have been used for
forecasting in the institution. Hence, the “new” method mentioned should shine up in the write-ins
9Basically a negative output gap, somewhat “normal” interest rates, no “zero lower bound” situation and a
“normal” Taylor rule for monetary policy reaction.
10Again the assumptions are given in appendix section B.
11Again the assumptions are given in appendix section B.
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Figure 6: Distribution of quantitative assessments
(a) Fiscal multipliers
(b) Money and inflation
(c) Impact of minimum wage on employment
Source: own survey and calculation
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Short-run multiplier 1.07 1.12 -0.40 [0.69] 214.5 [0.85]
Long-run multiplier 0.74 0.53 0.99 [0.32] 211.5 [0.36]
Short-run impact of money supply 0.10 0.16 1.04 [0.30] 109.5 [0.22]
Long-run impact of money supply 0.71 0.64 0.50 [0.63] 143 [0.54]
Short-run impact of minimum wage -0.10 -0.82 1.72 [0.10] 198.5 [0.04]













Short-run multiplier 1.25 1.08 -0.42 [0.71] 32 [0.87]
Long-run multiplier 0.67 0.65 -0.04 [0.97] 28 [0.89]
Short-run impact of money supply 0.35 0.11 -1.53 [0.34] 5.5 [0.08]
Long-run impact of money supply 1.00 0.69 -3.22 [0.01] 9 [0.27]
Short-run impact of minimum wage -1.00 -0.54 NA 16 [0.29]
Long-run impact of minimum wage 0.00 -0.88 NA 6.5 [0.64]
Notes: p-values in brackets. Source: own survey and calculation. NA: calculation impossible due to lack of
data.
for that question, but this was generally not the case.12
However, we can infer some other tendencies from the open question part: Some forecasters
seem to combine forecasts from different methods more often and re-evaluated their existing tool-
box after the Great Recession. Furthermore, the sources of forecast errors are evaluated more
often in some cases and measuring macroeconomic uncertainty seems to be more important for the
forecast.
3.6 Consensus, the loss function, and the risk of herding
In this part of the survey, we tried to collect direct evidence on some topics that have recently
been discussed in the academic literature about macroeconomic forecasting. To start with, we have
taken a look on the self-perceived orientation of the forecasters towards the consensus forecast.
The theoretical literature (Lamont, 2002) suggest that forecasters may face a trade-off: on one
hand, sticking to the consensus reduces the risk of a (relative) reputation loss in case of a wrong
prediction. On the other hand, departing from the consensus leads to additional attention from
the public, which might be valuable for forecasters. The results depicted in figure 8, suggests that
most of the forecasters seem to be risk-averse in this respect, i.e., being close to the consensus is
much more popular than departing from the other forecasters. This is in line with the findings in
the literature (see Dovern et al., 2012, 2014, and the literature cited therein).
Another interesting part of the behaviour of the forecasters is, how quick they react to new
information. Again, this might relate to the risk appetite of the individuals forecasters. Since
new information might turn out to be wrong, risk averse forecasters might prefer to stick to the
old forecast as long as not really strong case for a change can be made. Turning to our results,
such an attitude is quite popular among the respondents, whereas the idea to react quickly is less
frequently chosen. This again is in line with findings in the literature (see Nordhaus, 1987; Coibion
and Gorodnichenko, 2012, 2015, and the literature cited therein).
We have also tested, whether the attitude towards the forecasting process depends on the nature
of the forecasting institution (private vs. public). As the results in Table 7 show, the answers
12The statements that have been written into the free follow-up question are documented in appendix section C.
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Figure 7: Consequences of the Great Recession
In the aftermath of the Financial Crisis 2008/09 economic forecasts have been criticized (again). This leads to the
possibility that your institution may have changed its forecasting process. Which statements apply to your
institution?
Source: own survey and calculation









Null Hypothesis: Does not differ by nature of institution
Symmetrical loss function 3.6 4.0 0.26 0.21
Staying close to the consensus 2.1 3.0 0.01 0.01
Revising forecasts fast 2.5 2.6 0.54 0.52
Notes: The Likert scale is recoded in such a way that a higher value corresponds to a stronger agreement
to the statement. *) p-values. Source: own survey and calculation.
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Figure 8: Attitudes to consensus and loss functions
Which of the following statements applies to your institution?
Source: own survey and calculation
regarding the loss function and the speed of forecast revision seem to be quite similar, whereas the
consensus forecast has different meanings for public and private forecasters: it is more important
for public forecasters to stay on the neighborhood of the consensus forecast. Assuming that private
forecasters might have more incentives to search attention of the media etc., this finding would be
in line with the reasoning of Ehrbeck and Waldmann (1996).
Another important topic refers to the loss function of forecasters. Several papers (see Döpke
et al., 2010, and the literature cited therein) have tested, whether the loss function of the forecasters
may be asymmetric. Thus, we have asked the forecasters directly, whether they value over- and
underestimation differently. The vast majority of the forecasters is committed to a symmetric loss
function, only a very few of them see the loss function of their institution as asymmetric. Among
these answers, seeing over-estimation as more harmful is slightly more popular than the reverse
case.
3.7 The organization of the forecasting group and motivation of the forecasters
It is quite possible, that forecast accuracy is not just limited by factors surrounding the institution,
but also by the organization of the unit and motivation of its members. Hence, in a first step, we
elaborated on the discussion process within the forecasting unit (see figure 9). Interestingly, a very
large majority of the forecasters sees the final forecast as a consensus within the group. Decisions
by the majority of the group or hierarchical decision processes are mentioned less frequently.
To some extent, the answers seem to contradict each other (e.g., both, the statement according
to which the forecast is a consensus among the group, and the statement, according to which the
leader of the group makes the final decision find substantial support).
The results in figure 10 suggest that forecasters are to a surprisingly degree intrinsically moti-
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Figure 9: Decision making within the forecasting group
Which of the following statements applies to your institution?
Source: own survey and calculation
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Figure 10: Reasons to become a forecaster
What reasons did you have to become a forecaster?
Source: own survey and calculation
vated. While statements like “I enjoy forecasting” find widespread support, suggested answers that
would imply a extrinsic motivation are chosen only rarely. There arguably one interesting exception
from this general picture: forecasters often state that they want to be part of recent economic and
political developments and/ or like to have influence on economic policy. Insofar forecasters have
an own political agenda and/ or hope for jobs in governments or central banks, these motivations
might be seen as more extrinsic as compared to the sheer fun that forecasting might give to the
forecasters.
Of course, working as a forecaster also has its disadvantages. We asked for some specific factors
that might have demotivated the individuals that work in this area and report the results in Figure
11. The two most frequently chosen answers, however, might not be seen a specific to working in a
forecasting unit: working with the colleagues and the bosses is most likely problematic in virtually
all jobs from time to time. Factors that are more specific to the forecasting business are chosen
less frequently. This finding mirrors the results according to which forecasters like their job.
Nevertheless, some free answers to this question, listed in appendix section C, point to a prob-
lematic role of the forecasters in the public. For example, one forecaster claims that forecast are, in
fact, “irrelevant”. Another person complaints that there is little understanding for the forecasting
work, even by others economists. It goes almost without saying that several forecasts name forecast
errors and the related pressure and reputation loss as de-motivating.
3.8 Forecast quality by forecaster’s attributes
Hypotheses, which are arguably popular in the public opinion, state that forecast accuracy de-
pends on certain attributes of forecasters. Forecasters in public and private institutions might face
different incentives and, therefore, might be more or less successful in predicting future economic
20
Figure 11: What de-motivates Forecasters
Which aspects of the work as a forecaster do you find burdensome or demotivating?
Source: own survey and calculation
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developments. Forecasters that rely on a specific theoretical model might also be systematically
better or worse than those, who believe in another model.
Relying on the information of our survey, we are able to link a sub-sample of the forecasters to
the forecast accuracy of their institution. To this end, we use the “long-term” evaluation conducted
by Fricke (2016), who ranks several institution by forecast accuracy. Figure 12 depicts the (long-
run) rank of a forecasting institution by theoretical position (Panel (a) and by nature of institution
((Panel (b)). A higher rank corresponds to better forecast quality. While it seems not reasonable to
undertake any statistical inference (we have only 4 institutions that qualify as leaning Neoclassical)
eye-balling the data suggest no important differences between the two theoretical camps, although
the Keynesian-leaning forecasters perform slightly better if one refers to the mean rank. By and
large, the same holds for a break-down by the nature of the institution: no noteworthy differences
are detectable. There is, however, a much smaller variance across the public institutions in the
ranks.13 Still, we would conclude that our results are in line with previous findings of, e.g., Batchelor
and Dua (1990a), who conclude that “all forecasters are (statistically) equal.”
4 Conclusions
We have conducted a survey among active forecasters of the German business cycle. 82 forecasters
stemming from 37 different institutions have responded. The results suggest that practitioners in
the forecasting branch subscribe to well-established methods and theories. We find no close link
to the recent debates in the more academic sphere. This might relate to the distinction between
economists as “scientists” and “engineers” as argued by Mankiw (2006) and Colander (2017).
Recent approaches from the academic literature (like, e.g., DSGE models) are more popular among
forecaster from public institutions than among their colleagues from private institutions. In this
context, the differences between “scientists” and “engineers” is not necessarily a problem: as both
popular commentators of economic policy (Smith, 2017) and eminent academics (Blanchard, 2017)
have pointed out, there are divergent aims of macroeconomics require different types of models.
Regarding two aspects, we can confirm findings from the earlier literature: First, forecasters
seem to be risk-averse and tend to lean towards the consensus and second, there is a self-reported
behaviour to revise forecasts only gradually. Both is in line with the finding in the literature.
According to our results, there is almost no evidence that the behavior of forecasters has changed
substantially since the Great Recession. Confirming results form previous studies (Batchelor and
Dua, 1990b) we also cannot establish a stable relationship between preferred theories and methods
and forecast accuracy. The differences with respect to the theories forecasters subscribe to, however,
point to cohort effects similar to effects observed among the general public (Malmendier and Nagel,
2016).
Furthermore, from the open answer categories we can infer, that large forecast errors seem to
have in impact on the self-perception and self-reflection of forecasters. Several forecasters report
the high importance of uncertainty (in the Knightian sense) and report efforts to evaluate forecasts
more regularly and try to minimize the dependency from one method.
Further research should employ qualitative methods from other social science disciplines (sociol-
ogy, psychology, political sciences) to shed more light on the mechanisms of expectation formation
and the role of personal (historical) experience therein.
13At this point it is necessary to recall an important caveat of our analysis: we held the individual forecaster
accountable for the accuracy of his/ her institution. It might well be the case that the forecasters would have known
better, but was in a minority position within his/ her institution.
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Figure 12: Forecast quality by theoretical position and nature of institution
(a) by theoretical position
(b) by nature of institution
Source: Fricke (2016) and own survey and calculation
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A List of institutions invited
• Economic research institutes, that are formally politically and economically independent:
1. German Institute for Economic Research (DIW)
2. RWI - Leibniz-Institute for Economic Research
3. Halle Institute of Economic Research (IWH)
4. Kiel Institute for the World Economy
5. Ifo Institute – Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich
6. Institute for Employment Research (IAB)
• (Mostly) privately financed forecasting institutions:
7. Kiel Economics
8. FERI
9. Handelsblatt Research Institute
10. IHS Global
11. Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWI)14
12. Prognos
• Institutes that are financed by interest groups:
13. Macroeconomic Policy Institute (IMK)
14. Cologne Institute for Economic Research (IW)
• International organizations
15. International Monetary Fund (IMF)
16. European Commission (EC)
17. OECD
• Political institutions or institutions within the process of economic policy advice
18. German Council of Economic Experts (Staff)




22. Deutsche Bank Research
23. Postbank Research
24. Allianz Economic Research




29. Societe Generale Research
30. Union Investment
31. Goldman Sachs








14Up to 2005, this institute was named HWWA and mainly publicly funded. From 2006 onwards, the institute has












50. Bank J. Safra Sarasin
• Associations:
51. Bundesverband Deutscher Banken
52. Chambers of Commerce and Industry (DIHK)
53. Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie (BDI)
54. Mechanical Engineering Industry Association (VDMA)








C Write-in answers to questions
Elements of the forecasting process
The following statements have been made in response to the question: ”Which of the following elements do you take into
account in your forecasts?”under the category ”other”? (each item corresponds to one respondent)
• ”Ökonometrische Modelle” (Econometric models)
• ”Konjunkturdaten vom aktuellen Rand (Aufträge, Produktion) sowie Entwicklung an den Finanzmärkte und Preisen-
twicklung für Rohstoffe” (Recent economic data (order inflow, production) as well as the development at financial
markets and the prices of raw materials)
• ”Erfahrung” (Experience)
• ”Faustregeln” (Rules of thumb)
• ”Kurzfristige Konjunkturindikatoren” (Short-run business cycle indicators)
• ”Ökonomische Theorie” (Economic theory)
• ”Politökonomische Erwägungen” (Considerations based on political economy)
• ”Wissenschaftliche Erkenntnisse” (Scientific insights), ”Institutionelle Kenntnisse” (Institutional knowledge)
• ”Historische Erfahrungen” (Historical experiences)
• ”Persönliche Einschätzungen” (Personal assessments)
• ”Politische Bedürfnisse der höheren Ebenen” (Political necessities of higher levels)
• ”Persönliche Prognoseerfahrung” (Personal forecasting experience)
• ”Daten, institutionelle Fakten” (Data, institutional facts)
• ”Marktentwicklung” (Market developments)
• ”Diverse Indikatoren (Industrieproduktion, Einzelhandelsumsätze, Aufträge, Kreditvergabe, ...)” (Several indicators
(industrial production, retails turnover indices, loans)
• ”Prognoseirrtümer der Vergangenheit” (Past forecast errors)
• ”Geldpolitik” (Monetary policy)
• ”Finanzmarktpreise” (Prices on financial markets)
• ”Erfahrungswissen” (Experience-based knowledge)
• ”Analysen unterschiedlichster Institute/Ökonomen/Analysten” (Analyses of several institutes / economists / analysts)
• ”Eigene Unternehmensbefragung” (Own survey among firms);
• ”Amtliche Statistik” (Official statistics).
Other methods
The following additional or alternative models have been mentioned (each item corresponds to one respondent) in response to
the question: ”You have chosen ”Other methods” in the previous question. Please indicate briefly the method(-s) you have in
mind and how often they are used.”
• ”Zyklusvergleich” (Comparison of cycles) and ”Nicht-parametrische Methoden” (Non-parametric methods)
• ”Faustregeln” (Rules of thumb) and ”Historische Elastizitäten” (Historical elasticities)
• ”Judgemental adjustments, Horizontal brainstorming”
• ”Eigene Umfragen” (Own surveys)
• ”Zyklenvergleiche” (Comparison of cycles)
• ”Eigene Unternehmensbefragung” (own business survey) (Note: we have skipped additional information to kepp the
anonymity.)
• ”Kurzfristprognose-Modelle (Faktormodelle, Brückengleichungen). Häufig und regelmäßig (alle 2 Wochen).” (Short-term
forecasting models, factor models, bridge-equations, often and on a regular basis (every 2 weeks)).
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Other theories
The following statements have been made in response to the question: ”You have chosen ”other theories” in the previous
question. Please indicate briefly, which theories you have in mind and how important they are.”
• ”Debitismus” 15
• ”Klassische Politische Ökonomie(,) Marxismus” (Classical political economy, Marxism)
Reasons for forecast errors
The following additional possible reasons of forecast errors have been mentioned (each item corresponds to one respondent):
• ”Annahme unveränderter Politik” (Assumption of an unchanged policy)
• ”Hohe Komplexität: Die falschen Wirkungszusammenhänge hervorgehoben” (High complexity, the wrong causal rela-
tions highlighted)
• ”Die Zukunft ist unbekannt.” (The future is unknown)
• ”Unvorhergesehen Ereignisse, außer Naturkatastrophen.” (Unforeseen events except natural disasters)
• ”Prognosefehler bei exogenen Variablen, die als Input im Modell verwendet werden, z.B. Welthandel, Wechselkurs,
Ölpreis” (Forecast errors for exogenous variables, that are used as inputs for the model (e.g. world trade, exchange
rates, oil prices)
• ”Die Frage ist allgemein formuliert, d.h. alle denkbaren Gründe sind irgendwann irgendwo einmal relevant gewesen”
(The question is formulated too general, i.e. all possible reasons have been relevant at some place for a certain time.)
• ”Die Zukunft ist unbekannt.” (The future is unknown)
• ”Ferientage und Saisoneffekte falsch” (Trading days and seasonal effects wrong)
• ”Überbewertung von persönlichen Eindrücken und Stimmungen” (Too much weight for personal impressions and senti-
ments)
• ”Shit happens”.
• ”ökonomische Schocks treten auf, die per Annahme ausgeschlossen wurden.” (Economic shocks occur that have been
ruled out by assumption)
Changes due to financial crisis
The following statements have been given in response to the question about what has changed in the forecasting process due
to the Financial Crisis:
• ”Überarbeitung bestehender und Schätzung neuer ökonometrischer Modelle (neue Indikatoren, Model Averaging)”
(Overhaul of existing and estimation of new econometric models (new indicators, model averaging))
• ”Wir sind uns der Ungenauigkeit bewusster, denken in größeren Banbbreiten, legen mehr Wert auf Risikoszenarien”
(We are more aware of inaccuracy, think in broader bandwidths, give greater emphasize on risk scenarios)
• ”Systematische Prognosefehlerevaluation” (Systematic forecast error evaluation)
• ”Literatur zur Prognose ist vielschichtiger geworden und erfordert eingehenderes Studium.” (The literature regarding
forecasts has become more complex and demands in-depth studies)
• ”Vielfalt der Prognosemethoden und -modelle und Prognosekombination” (Diversity of forecasting methods, models,
and combination)
• ”Wir schauen starker auf Unsicherheitsmaße, die auf Marktpreisen basieren. Außerdem beachten wir mehr die Bilanzen
der Unternehmen und privaten Haushalte, weil laufende Bilanzbereinigungen das Wachstum schwächen. Schließlich
sind Blasen wichtiger geworden.” (We are looking more strongly on measures of uncertainty, that rely on market prices.
Moreover, consider more strongly the balance sheets of firms and private households, since balance sheet adjustments
weaken economic growth. Finally, bubbles have become more important.)
• ”Anpassung der eigenen Befragungsmethodik (kürzerer Befraungszeitraum, schnellere Veröffentlichung)” (Adjustment
of the own survey technique (shorter survey period, faster publication). )
15This view traces back to Heinsohn and Steiger (2013).
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Demotivation
The following statements have been given in response to the question, what possibly de-motivates forecasters (each item
corresponds to one respondent):
• ”Konjunkturprognosen sind faktisch irrelevant.” (Business cycle forecasts are - in fact - irrelevant)
• ”Dass wenig Zeit für anderes bleibt” (That there is not enough time for other things)
• ”Die falsche Wahrnehmung über die Treffsicherheit von Konjunkturprognosen. In der Öffentlichkeit und bei Kollegen
wird zu wenig anerkannt, wie unsicher (Schocks usw.) das Eintreten von Prognosen ist. Ferner wird dann auf fehlende
Kompetenz geschlossen. Das trifft nicht nur auf die Öffentlichkeit, sondern auch auf andere Volkswirte anderer Bereiche
zu.” (The wrong perception of the forecasts. The public opinion and the colleagues do not sufficiently recognize how
uncertain (shocks etc.) the realisation of forecasts is. Moreover, from this it is concluded that forecasters are not
competent. This does not only hold for the general public, but also for economist from other areas).
• ”Nichts” (Nothing).
• ”Politische Einflussnahme” (Political influencing)
• ”Das geringe Grundverständnis anderer Wissenschaftler und der Öffentlichkeit für die Prognosearbeit (z.B. inhärente
Prognosefehler, Aufwand Porognosen zu erstellen, Relevanz für andere Bereiche wie wirtschaftspolitische Bereiche” (The
little understanding of other scientist and the public for forecasting work. (e.g., inherent forecast errors, the effort to
produce forecasts, the relevance for other areas and areas of economic policy).
• ”Nichts davon in relevantem Maße” (Nothing of the above to a relevant extend)
• ”Die Datenqualitaet” (Data quality)
• ”Die geringe Prognosegüte” (The lack of forecasts accuracy)
• ”Ungünstiges Verhältnis von Aufwand (Daten-, Modellupdate, Text schreiben etc.) und Ertrag (Aufmerksamkeit i.S.v.
”in der wirtschaftspolitischen Debatte Gehör finden” (Unfavourable relation of effort (data and model update, writing
text, etc.) and rewards (attention in the economic policy debate)
• ”Nichts” (Nothing)
• ”Keine” (None)
• ”Fehlprognosen” (Forecast errors)
• ”Nichts” (Nothing)
• ”Limited time budget”
• ”Der generelle Stress im Beruf” (The general stress in the job)
• ”Druck bei Fehlprognosen” (Pressure in case of forecast errors).
Other remarks
At the end of the questionnaire, we asked in a free question for general comments, which may have occurred during answering
the survey
• ”Die Fragen zu Fiskalmultiplikator, Mindestlohn etc empfide ich als sehr problematisch, da das Situationsbedingte/der
Kontext noch viel mehr abgefragt werden müsste” (I see the question regarding the fiscal multiplier, minimum wage
etc. as very problematic, since the situational context should have been queried much more precisely)
• ”Beim langfristigen Fiskalmultiplikator hätte ich gerne die Möglichkeit gehabt, einen negativen Wert einzugeben.” (As
regards the long-run multiplier I would like to had the opportunity to enter a negative value)
• ”Mir wären oftmals eindeutige Antwortmöglichkeiten wie ja/nein lieber als diese graduellen Abstufungen.” (I would
have preferred clear-cut yes/no-answer opportunities instead of the graduations.)
• ”Makroökonomische Konjunkturprognosen sind weit mehr als nur eine möglichst treffsichere Punktprognose für BIP-
Wachstum oder Inflation. Jenseits der kurzen Frist (1-2 Quartale) ist die Prognosegüte nicht anhand des Prognosefehlers
festzumachen (einfache Vergleichsmodelle wie AR-Prognosen sind dort nämlich kaum zu schlagen), sondern anhand der
Konsistenz und Stimmigkeit des Prognosegesamtbildes und seiner verschiedenen Komponenten (”Story” hinter dem
Prognose-Basisszeario - dieses stellt die aus Sicht des Prognostikers wahrscheinlichste Entwicklung bedingt auf die
exogenen Annahmen und auf die Annahme des Abklingens vergangener ökonomischer Schocks und des Ausbleibens
zukünftiger Schocks dar” (Macroeconomic business cycle forecasts are much more than just as precise as possible a
point forecast of GDP growth or inflation. Beyond the very short-run time horizon(1-2 quarters) forecast accuracy
cannot be measured with a simple forecast error (since simple competing models like AR models are much better in
this regard). Rather, forecasts have to be judged by the consistency and coherence of the underlying picture and its
different components (the ”story” of the base-scenario of the forecast, which gives the most likely development in the
eyes of the forecaster given the assumptions for exogenous factors and the unwinding of past economic shocks and the
non-existence of future shocks) )
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